compensation after an adverse ai transition may arrive too late to use. acausal offers a bargain beforehand: fund a payment now in exchange for a limited share of later project income.

token holders can take the funded payment by retiring tokens. buyers advance usdc for future receipts. the money comes from collected trading fees, contributions and the advance itself.

an experiment inspired by functional decision theory. the contracts implement a present-day exchange, with no assumed payment from a future ai.

two positions on what comes next

01 / the present

finitists

“i want compensation while i can use it.”

you offer
tokens for permanent retirement.
you receive
usdc, withdrawable when the full offer fills.

check the price before committing. accepted tokens are burned; you can keep the rest.

finitist → offer tokens

02 / the future

continuists

“i can wait for what comes next.”

you offer
escrowed usdc to fund a holder payment.
you receive
a capped income claim if the token quota fills.

the claim has a fixed cash ceiling and a 180-day term. you may recover less than you advance, or nothing.

continuist → advance usdc

two positions on waiting, not predictions of ai doom. you can use either path, or neither. the links below each position take you to its controls; they make no transaction.

how the two meet

  1. a continuist funds an offer. the usdc is escrowed. an available share of the compensation reserve may add to the holder payment.
  2. finitists see the price and tender. they can reduce or retract a partial tender while the offer is open, then withdraw the released tokens. the buyer can cancel before the first tender.
  3. the final tender settles. when the 5% quota is filled, the same transaction burns those tokens and assigns the funded payment. the buyer receives a capped share of later project income.

an incomplete offer expires after seven days. buyer cash and holder tokens remain recoverable without an operator acting at the deadline.

facility

standing offers and withdrawals

continuists fund an offer; finitists see its price before tendering. the last tender needed to fill the quota settles the exchange. there is no separate closing action.

token 0x9E681791F2CAb8A68305852Fd43112F228D8A8F1 · clanker
facility 0x5F92A927BCe014252AB9f0016A8B4412aA582078

no offer loaded.

01 / the present

finitists

tender tokens for retirement

no open offer selected.

enter your total tender, not an additional amount. set zero to retract while open. filling the quota burns the tokens in that transaction.

02 / the future

continuists

advance usdc for later receipts

open a funded offer when no other offer is open.

after the first tender, your advance stays committed until the quota fills or the seven-day offer expires. later income may be zero.

your credits

load an older offer to release its tender. cash and token withdrawal credits can be claimed independently of any current offer.

selected-offer tender— tokens
cash withdrawal credit— usdc
token withdrawal credit— tokens
other actions

a buyer can cancel before the first tender; anyone can cancel after expiry. reserve-only exits require enough accumulated reserve. income posting and pool collection are permissionless and require gas. if the fee source is unavailable, usdc already held by the vault can still be posted separately.

no guaranteed exit or full liquidation. pool-fee conversion has no guaranteed exchange rate. do not send tokens directly to the income vault.

mechanism in detail · diagram and example

system diagram

finitists offer tokens for retirement. continuists fund their payment for a limited share of later income. either position is voluntary.

funded offer → token retirement → later receipts

01 funds available

pool fees + contributionsusdc received by the vault; gifts also count as income
founder40% on first 250 usdc of gross income; 20% afterward
operations10% of gross income
compensationremainder; buyer claims are paid from this portion

income is recorded when posted. with no active buyer claim, compensation enters the reserve. the reserve is separate from a buyer’s principal.

02 standing offer

continuist escrows usdca buyer can open without fee history; another buyer may improve the funded price. an outbid buyer can withdraw their principal.
finitists tender tokenssee the funded pot and exact token quota first. a partial tender can be reduced or withdrawn while the offer is open.
does the full 5% quota arrive within seven days?q = floor(accounting supply / 20); the holder pot is buyer cash plus its proportionate reserve allocation
yes ↓
settles in the final tender transactionburn exactly q; assign all funded usdc to tenderers; activate a capped buyer claim if a buyer funded the offer.
no / expired ↓
independent recoverybuyer recovers the advance; tenderers recover tokens; unused reserve returns to the facility.

there is no scheduled selection or closing transaction. the buyer can cancel before anyone tenders. after the first tender, the buyer is committed until fill or expiry.

03 later receipts

new compensation incomefirst split from gross income as above; it is not paid from later buyers’ deposits
buyer’s limited sharethe retired fraction of posted compensation, up to 1.5 × the advance
remaining compensationreturns to the reserve for later holder payments

the claim lasts up to 180 days. if nobody posts income on time, the next post performs one capped catch-up before closure. one buyer claim can be active at once; funded reserve-only exits may continue.

example · hypothetical usdc amounts

a 5% quota, a 250 usdc advance and a 50 usdc reserve allocation give holders 300 usdc on a complete fill. the buyer can collect at most 375 usdc from later compensation income. with no later income, the buyer loses the 250 usdc advance; the holders keep their funded payment.

the timing of a trade does not prove the timing of income posting. an upstream cash or chain failure can delay collection. no contract can guarantee that someone will trade, tender or pay gas.

the decision-theory connection

in functional decision theory, by yudkowsky and soares, an agent evaluates possible outputs of its decision function, accounting for dependencies that can include another system computing or predicting that function. a logical dependency need not be a causal influence. committing to a contract is not, by itself, such a dependency.

the reference motivates the question, not a derivation of the mechanism: what terms could make funding people earlier worthwhile to someone who values later outcomes? acausal offers one present-day answer: fund token retirement now for a limited claim on subsequent project income.

the facility uses ordinary commitment and a sale of future receipts. it does not run an fdt decision algorithm or establish acausal trade. that would require an argument about a counterparty’s decision procedure and its logical dependence on ours; there is no such argument here.

ordinary causal reasoning can support either side at an appropriate price. a future ai is not a party to this contract.

terms

incomeusdc forwarded by the receipt vault, including converted pool fees and gifts. trading volume is not income.
cash split40% founder on the first 250 usdc of lifetime income, then 20%. operations receives 10% throughout; compensation receives the remainder. the early supplement is capped at 50 usdc and never resets. amounts are subject to smallest-unit rounding.
offer size5% of accounting supply, rounded down. reserve allocation and the buyer’s receipt share use that same fraction.
offer lifetimeseven days from opening. the buyer may cancel before any tender; afterward the advance is committed until the offer fills or expires. partial holders may retract before fill.
fundingat least 1 usdc in the funded holder pot. a buyer may open the first offer without fee history. a reserve-only exit needs enough reserve. the full token quota must be tendered.
buyer claimthe retired fraction of later compensation income, capped at 1.5 times the buyer’s advance, for up to 180 days. a late posting performs one bounded catch-up before closure. one buyer claim can be active at a time; reserve-only exits may continue meanwhile.
pool fee1% configured lp fee, plus the upstream protocol charge: approximately 1.2% in total. the cash split applies to project receipts, not to trading volume or holder payouts.

these terms were fixed at deployment. read the transaction and contract addresses in the facility before interacting.

founder allocation

3% of initial token supply goes to the founder: locked for 30 days, then released linearly over 180 days. it is fully vested on day 210. the other 97% seeds the initial pool. there is no initial founder purchase.

claiming vested tokens does not turn them into cash; selling requires a buyer and available liquidity. founder cash credits are separate from token sales and retirement offers. anyone can deliver a funded cash credit to its recorded owner; the caller cannot redirect it. this still requires a gas-paying transaction.

founder, token administration and operations use 0x9CF20dAfEfd34B6c02eFA9f20C99C06D4f4e2A13. this wallet receives both cash shares. operations funds are accounted for separately.

scope and assumptions

usdc is the cash leg of the bargain. once pool rewards are collected and posted in usdc, that amount no longer follows the project token’s price. fees left in the pool still require collection, and an onchain credit still requires a gas-paying delivery or withdrawal transaction.

“compensation” names an allocation of project income, not an assessment of anyone’s losses. the ai transition motivates paying earlier; it is not an event the contracts detect. the facility cannot guarantee compensation for ai-related losses. if project income and liquidity disappear, they may fail precisely when a payment is most wanted.

an advance prices a cash-flow claim; it is not a probability of ai takeover. the buyer may recover nothing. holders receive funded withdrawal credits only after a successful fill; those credits still require a withdrawal transaction.

pool-fee conversion has no guaranteed exchange rate. usdc transfers can be restricted by its issuer, and upstream contracts retain their own authorities. user actions require gas. no founder, laptop or server has to act at a deadline for participants to recover an incomplete offer.

there is no guaranteed redemption price or complete liquidation. accounting supply is initial issuance less facility retirements, not the token supply currently on base. independent burns and bridge movements do not reduce that denominator. below 20 smallest token units, new offers stop; existing credits remain available, subject to asset transfer restrictions.